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Niels Bohr famously insisted on the indispensability of what he termed “classical concepts.” In
the context of the decoherence program, on the other hand, it has become fashionable to talk about
the “dynamical emergence of classicality” from the quantum formalism alone. Does this mean
that decoherence challenges Bohr’s dictum—for example, that classical concepts do not need to be
assumed but can be derived? In this paper, we’ll try to shed some light down the murky waters
where formalism and philosophy mingle. To begin, we’ll clarify the notion of classicality in the
decoherence description. We’ll then discuss Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s takes on the quantum–classical
problem and reflect on the different meanings of the terms “classicality” and “classical concepts” in
the writings of Bohr and his followers. This analysis will allow us to put forward some tentative
suggestions for how we may better understand the relation between decoherence-induced classicality
and Bohr’s classical concepts.
PACS numbers: 01.65.+g, 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Yz
I. INTRODUCTION
What does the term “classical” mean in the context
of quantum mechanics? A wealth of confusing uses of
this word abounds in the literature. For instance, the
formalism of quantum mechanics is often said to arise
from a quantization of classical variables. And while the
textbook axioms make no mention of the word “classical,”
there’s often talk of a classical limit, as in the context of
Bohr’s correspondence principle, Ehrenfest’s theorem, or
Feynman’s path-integral formalism.
And turning to more philosophically tinged territory,
Niels Bohr famously insisted on the indispensability of
classical concepts in applying and making sense of quan-
tum theory. In particular, he assigned paramount impor-
tance to the notion of classical measuring apparatuses—a
move that served as a lightning rod for countless foun-
dational debates and may have fueled a fair amount of
anti-Copenhagen rhetoric.
Now enter the modern age of quantum theory, and with
it one of its darlings: the decoherence program [1–4]. De-
coherence has boldly proclaimed its ability to explain the
emergence of “classicality” and the “classical world of our
experience” from within quantum mechanics. And deco-
herence declares to accomplish this goal without recourse
to any additional formal or philosophical baggage.
“What else could we need!” we exclaim with delight.
“Clearly, decoherence makes the a priori assumption of
classical structures superfluous. Bohr was wrong!”
After all, so our thinking might go, if classicality can
be shown to arise as a natural consequence of a realistic
application of the quantum formalism, how could Bohr’s
insistence on the irreducibility of the classical concepts
possibly remain justified and stand any chance at all?
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Indeed, many people seem to feel that way. For exam-
ple, Zeh has contrasted the dynamical approach of de-
coherence to the quantum–classical problem with what
he calls the “irrationalism” of the Copenhagen school [1,
p. 27]. There’s always been a good deal of resentment
to Bohr’s mantra of classical concepts, and decoherence
appears to have only aggravated these feelings.
While it might be tempting to read the implications
of the decoherence mechanism as making Bohr’s dictum
redundant, in this paper we shall argue that the matter
is in fact significantly more subtle. To anticipate our con-
clusion in one oversimplified, informal slogan: Bohr and
decoherence aren’t talking about the same kind of classi-
cality.
Only once such differences are properly recognized can
we hope to understand how the decoherence account and
Bohr’s classical concepts relate to each other and may
challenge each other. In this paper, we’ll make an at-
tempt in this direction. Our analysis won’t be the last
word, but it’s a start. We shall also refer you to a previous
(and significantly longer) paper of ours [5]. There, liber-
ated from the space constraints of a conference paper, we
devote much more room to the fascinating historical as-
pects of the subject. We’re just mentioning this tidbit in
case you’re experiencing an insatiable hunger for a sec-
ond helping of quotes from Bohr and his disciples. If not,
then this paper may be enough to quench your thirst.
II. CLASSICALITY IN THE
DECOHERENCE PROGRAM
Decoherence is not an addition to quantum theory but
simply a consequence of it. Its formal description pro-
ceeds within the standard framework of quantum states
and density matrices. Let’s begin by recapping the de-
coherence formalism in all brevity (see [1–4] for actual
reviews).
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ment, and a von Neumann measurement-like interaction
between the two entities. This makes the superposition,
which had been initially confined to the system, spread
to the environment, and we end up with an entangled
composite state. We’re now interested in what we may
be able to observe by measuring the system, disregarding
the environment. This restriction simply reflects the fact
that, in practice, we can’t actually access the majority of
the environmental degrees of freedom. Quantum mechan-
ics tells us how to compute the statistics of all possible
measurements on the system: we need to simply “trace
out” the environment in the system–environment density
matrix. And what pops out is the reduced density matrix,
which is the main object of interest for decoherence.
What we now find is that typically this density ma-
trix will be approximately diagonal in an eigenbasis of
some classical observable, such as position, and that the
density matrix will remain approximately diagonal over
time. (The specific basis is determined by the structure
of the interaction Hamiltonian.) This means that inter-
ference terms in this basis become quickly and strongly
damped. Such terms correspond to (the probabilities of)
possible outcomes of measurements of observables that
are often explicitly nonclassical. It is in this sense that
decoherence explains why it is usually easy to measure a
classical observable but so painfully difficult to observe
nonclassical states.
So let’s note two things at this point. First, the clas-
sicality that decoherence is talking about is strictly asso-
ciated with properties of reduced density matrices. De-
coherence shows how the evolution of the system’s (re-
duced) density matrix is influenced by the system’s cou-
pling to its environment. Decoherence thus amounts to a
filter on the space of density matrices, singling out those
density matrices that can be practically realized given
the inevitably openness of any realistic physical system.
And this immediately leads us to our second point.
When we’re focusing our search for classicality to level of
the quantum-state formalism—as decoherence is doing—
then the kind of states decoherence deems classical in
appearance are in fact, arguably, among the least classi-
cal ones we can think of. To see why, it’ll be helpful to
sketch a hierarchy of classicality for quantum states.
A natural definition of a classical observable would be
an observable that corresponds to the measurement of a
quantity that exists in classical physics. Energy, angular
momentum, position, and momentum are obvious exam-
ples. However, the degree of classicality will depend on
whether the observable refers to discrete or continuous
quantities. A pure eigenstate of a classical observables
with a discrete spectrum would be the most classical
quantum state: the system then possesses a well-defined,
sharp value of a classical physical quantity.
Many classical observables, on the other hand, have a
continuous spectrum. Position and momentum are text-
book examples. It is well known that there are no phys-
ically meaningful quantum states that are sharp eigen-
states of continuous observables, since such states would
be non-normalizable. Therefore the best we can do is
to form narrow wave packets (e.g., Gaussians) in these
variables, that is, superpositions of (say) eigenkets |x〉
or |p〉 with a narrow spread in x or p, or in both direc-
tions (coherent states are those optimally narrow in both
x and p). Such states are often called “quasiclassical.”
This term is quite appropriate, though it may not fully
express the strong quantum–classical tension inherent in
a state of this kind. On the one hand, a (say) coherent
state appears indeed similar to that of a classical point
mass with a somewhat smeared-out phase-space trajec-
tory. On the other hand, however, the state remains
distinctly quantum-mechanical, because it is a coherent
superposition of the “classical” state vectors |x〉 (or |p〉).
So approximate eigenstates of continuous classical observ-
ables will obviously rank lower on the classicality scale
than sharp eigenstates of discrete classical observables.
What about observables without counterpart in classi-
cal physics? A mild intermediate case is spin. Spin is
a truly quantum-mechanical quantity, and therefore spin
observables are not classical per se. But one may say
that spin is largely analogous to the concept of angular
momentum in classical physics, and it is in this sense
that spin observables are often regarded as residing on a
similar footing as classical observables.
But this peculiar example aside, pretty much any ob-
servable that the quantum formalism allows us to write
down fails to represent anything familiar from classical
physics. A particular class are “proverbially nonclassi-
cal” observables, that is, observables whose eigenstates
correspond to a superposition of macroscopically distinct
eigenstates of classical observables. One (if somewhat
silly) example is the projective observable directly veri-
fying the presence of a Schro¨dinger-cat superposition. It
should be obvious that eigenstates of such observables
are located at the very bottom of the classicality scale
of quantum states. We note in passing that it is pre-
cisely such nonclassical, counterintuitive cat-type states
that are often used to illustrate the consequences of de-
coherence.
So far, we’ve only talked about pure states. A proper
mixture ρˆ =
∑
k
pk|ψk〉〈ψk| won’t introduce anything
spectacularly new, because such a mixture simply rep-
resents an ignorance-interpretable [6] ensemble, i.e., the
coefficients pk represent probabilities that express purely
our subjective ignorance about the particular pure state
|ψk〉 the system has actually been prepared in.
However, the creatures decoherence toys with are of a
very different breed. Because the system is caught up in
massive environmental entanglement, we can no longer
work with pure states or proper mixtures: reduced den-
sity matrices is all we’ve got at our disposal. These are
improper mixtures, where the term “improper” is used
to signify that, all apparent formal similarities notwith-
standing, such mixtures must not be interpreted as an
ignorance-interpretable (proper) ensemble. Instead, re-
duced density matrices do no more—and no less—than
3encapsulate the statistics of all future local measurements
that could be performed on the system. Because of entan-
glement, no quantum state can be assigned to the system
alone, and improper density matrices cannot be used to
infer a classical ensemble of states of which one state is
actually realized in the system.
It should now be clear why the states that arise from
decoherence rank so low on the classicality scale of quan-
tum states. These states are reduced density matrices
describing improper ensembles. They evolve toward only
approximate diagonality, leaving nonvanishing interfer-
ence terms. And the eigenbasis is often merely quasi-
classical, as in the case of improper mixtures of coherent
states. This is a far cry from what we’d consider an
obviously classical quantum state, such as a pure sharp
eigenstate of a classical observable. But needless to say,
this statement is meant as a clarification, not as a critical
jab at decoherence: the kind of states decoherence gives
us are as good as they get, given the inevitable openness
of realistic quantum systems.
III. CLASSICALITY IN BOHR’S AND
HEISENBERG’S INTERPRETATION OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS
It is quite fashionable to contrast Bohr’s we-need-
classical-measuring-apparatuses account with von Neu-
mann’s just-apply-the-quantum-formalism-to-everything
description of measurement. In this reading, it is as if
Bohr had been desperately clinging to some vestige of a
classical mindset, whereas von Neumann had been the ad-
mirably consistent all-is-quantum man who let the quan-
tum do the talking.
But Bohr recognized very well the dramatic conse-
quences of nonseparability resulting from entanglement—
as starkly illustrated by von Neumann’s measurement
scheme—and viewed this nonseparability as a central
epistemological paradox posed by quantum theory. Bohr
explained that, in contrast with classical physics, quan-
tum mechanics confronts us with the “impossibility of
any sharp separation between the behavior of atomic
objects and the interaction with the measuring instru-
ments which serve to define the very conditions under
which the phenomena appear” [7, p. 210]. If the system
and the measuring probe become an entangled quantum-
mechanical whole, then the distinction between system
and probe becomes fundamentally ambiguous. For Bohr,
the possibility of such a distinction was a logical necessity
for empirical inquiry. If everything is just gobbled up by
ever-spreading entanglement and homogenized into one
gargantuan maelstrom of nonlocal quantum holism, and
if we can’t conceptually isolate and localize a system and
regard it as causally independent from some (potentially
distant) other system, then there are no systems that
could be the object of empirical knowledge. In order to
meaningfully speak of observation in quantum mechanics,
Bohr concluded, “one must therefore cut out a partial
system somewhere from the world, and one must make
‘statements’ or ‘observations’ just about this partial sys-
tem” [8, p. 141]. And so, while quantum mechanics could
certainly be used to describe the interaction between sys-
tem and the measuring instrument, as von Neumann ex-
plicitly did, for Bohr such a move was self-defeating, be-
cause to do so would render the distinction between ob-
ject and instrument ambiguous and preclude one from
treating the measuring instrument as such. Heisenberg,
in discussions that followed Bohr’s Como paper in 1927,
expressed a similar sentiment: “One may treat the whole
world as one mechanical system, but then only a math-
ematical problem remains while access to observation is
closed off” [8, p. 141].
Bohr’s epistemological demand for a “cut between the
observed system on the one hand and the observer and
his apparatus on the other hand” also became a key
theme of Heisenberg’s thinking. However, for Heisen-
berg, the object–instrument divide was coincident with
the quantum–classical divide. For instance, in a 1934 lec-
ture, Heisenberg emphasized that “there arises the ne-
cessity to draw a clear dividing line in the description
of atomic processes, between the measuring apparatus of
the observer which is described in classical concepts, and
the object under observation, whose behavior is repre-
sented by a wave function” [9, p. 15]. The following year,
he elaborated on this idea:
In this situation it follows automatically that,
in a mathematical treatment of the process,
a dividing line must be drawn between, on
the one hand, the apparatus which we use as
an aid in putting the question and thus, in
a way, treat as part of ourselves, and on the
other hand, the physical systems we wish to
investigate. The latter we represent mathe-
matically as a wave function. This function,
according to quantum theory, consists of a
differential equation which determines any fu-
ture state from the present state of the func-
tion . . . The dividing line between the system
to be observed and the measuring apparatus
is immediately defined by the nature of the
problem but it obviously signifies no discon-
tinuity of the physical process. For this reason
there must, within certain limits, exist com-
plete freedom in choosing the position of the
dividing line [10, p. 49, emphasis added].
First, it’s interesting to note that Heisenberg conjures up
the image of the apparatus as something that’s part of
the observer, as a kind of prosthetic hand if you wish (see
the program of Quantum Bayesianism [11] for a modern
take on this idea). Second, the italicized phrase of the
quote clearly shows that the cut “obviously” must not
be understood as a physical boundary: it’s not a bor-
der at which the laws of physics change, or something
that delineates the breakdown region of quantum me-
chanics. Third, as the above quote hints at, for Heisen-
4berg the “cut can be shifted arbitrarily far in the direc-
tion of the observer in the region that can otherwise be
described according to the laws of classical physics,” but,
of course, “the cut cannot be shifted arbitrarily in the di-
rection of the atomic system” [12, p. 414]. The cut “can-
not be established physically”—it represents no physical
discontinuity—“and moreover it is precisely the arbitrari-
ness in the choice of the location of the cut that is decisive
for the application of quantum mechanics” [12, p. 416].
It is important to realize that Heisenberg’s views on
the cut were somewhat at odds with Bohr’s own view of
the problem. Indeed, in an exchange of correspondence
in 1935 Heisenberg and Bohr argued the point without
resolution. Some twenty years later Heisenberg would
report that “Bohr has emphasized that it is more realis-
tic to state that the division into the object and rest of
the world is not arbitrary” and that the object is deter-
mined by the very nature of the experiment [13, p. 24].
In a letter to Heelan in 1975, Heisenberg also explained
that he and Bohr had never really resolved their disagree-
ment. Heisenberg remained convinced “that a cut could
be moved around to some extent while Bohr preferred to
think that the position is uniquely defined in every exper-
iment” [14, p. 137]. While a closer analysis of the nature
of this disagreement would take us well beyond the scope
of this paper, this episode serves to remind us that we
should be careful about attributing the views of Bohr’s
contemporaries to Bohr himself.
But let’s move on and take a closer look at Bohr’s clas-
sical concepts. What exactly is their nature? And why
are we entitled to use them at all, given that the laws
of quantum mechanics trump those of classical physics?
To shed some light on these questions, and to clarify pos-
sible connections with decoherence, it’s useful to make
two points. The first is that for Bohr, quantum mechan-
ics makes use of classical concepts, such as position and
momentum, in spite of the limitations of their applicabil-
ity. Thus, what we earlier called “quasiclassical” states
were, for Bohr, evidence of the continued use of concepts
borrowed from classical physics. As Heisenberg recalled
from his discussions with Bohr in 1927: “Well, in spite
of your Uncertainty Principle you have got to use words
like ‘position’ and ‘velocity’ just because you haven’t got
anything else” [15, interview with Thomas S. Kuhn, 27
February 1963]. This is why Bohr repeatedly insisted
that “it lies in the nature of physical observation . . . that
all experience must ultimately be expressed in terms of
classical concepts” [16, p. 94, emphasis added].
But why do we, or why must we, interpret observa-
tions in classical terms? One approach amounts to an
epistemological formulation of the doctrine of classical
concepts. Its aim was to elucidate why our conceptual
framework is so wedded to our classical intuitions about
the world. Such accounts are often given a decisively lin-
guistic spin. For example, Petersen suggested that Bohr’s
remarks on the indispensability of classical concepts “are
based on his general attitude to the epistemological sta-
tus of language and to the meaning of unambiguous con-
ceptual communication, and they should be interpreted
in that background” [17, p. 179]. The following quote
from Bohr—a rather clear expression of his doctrine—
would appear to support such a reading:
It is decisive to recognize that, however far
the phenomena transcend the scope of clas-
sical physical explanation, the account of all
evidence must be expressed in classical terms.
The argument is simply that by the word “ex-
periment” we refer to a situation where we
can tell others what we have done and what
we have learned and that, therefore, the ac-
count of the experimental arrangement and
of the results of the observations must be ex-
pressed in unambiguous language with suit-
able application of the terminology of classi-
cal physics [7, p. 209].
This brings us to the second point concerning Bohr’s
views. Passages such as this one have often been in-
terpreted as reflecting Bohr’s attitude that we are “sus-
pended in language.” At the same time, however, we
must pay particular attention to the emphasis that Bohr
placed on the purpose of experiment. In Bohr’s view,
any attempt to account for the epistemic function of an
experiment and for the way the experiment has been de-
signed will invariably fall back on the use of classical con-
cepts. While the measuring instrument may of course be
described as a quantum-mechanical system, it is only pos-
sible to explain its capacity to function as an instrument
on the assumption that the interaction between object
and instrument can be described in terms of an exchange
of energy and momentum somewhere in space and time.
This is why, for Bohr, “the unambiguous interpretation
of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms
of classical physical theories, and we may say that in this
sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain
the language of physics for all time” [18, p. 692, emphasis
added].
It is important to bear in mind that Bohr’s doctrine
of classical concepts was reinterpreted by many of his
contemporaries. For instance, while Bohr expressed the
view that we must use classical concepts, Bohr disciples,
such as Rosenfeld, Heisenberg, and Weizsa¨cker, tended
to prefer a less dogmatic reading. In their hands, the
doctrine was transformed from a categorical imperative
to a pragmatic statement of fact (see also [19, pp. 197–9]).
Witness, for example, this quote from Weizsa¨cker:
We ought not to say, “Every experiment that
is even possiblemust be classically described,”
but “Every actual experiment known to us
is classically described, and we do not know
how to proceed otherwise.” . . . Thus the fac-
tual, we might almost say historical situation
of physics is made basic to our propositions
[20, pp. 128, 130].
This later, more pragmatic, position would seem to sit
better with many physicists today. At the end of the
5day, however, we’re still left with the question of why is
the world is wired in such a way that the concepts of clas-
sical physics are applicable at all. This entails that we
shift from an epistemological formulation of the question
(characteristic of Bohr’s own approach) to an ontological
one. This second approach was indeed pursued in the
1950s and 1960s by some of Bohr’s acolytes. They were
seeking a physical formulation of the doctrine of classical
concepts that would account for the emergence of some
kind of effective classicality from the quantum descrip-
tion. Weizsa¨cker described the task at hand:
Having thus accepted the falsity of classical
physics, taken literally, we must ask how it
can be explained as an essentially good ap-
proximation [when describing objects at the
macrolevel]. . . . This amounts to asking
what physical condition must be imposed on
a quantum-theoretical system in order that it
should show the features which we describe as
“classical.” . . . I am unable to prove mathe-
matically that the condition of irreversibility
would suffice to define a classical approxima-
tion, but I feel confident it is a necessary con-
dition [21, pp. 28–29, emphasis in original].
The idea that an irreversibility of the processes taking
place in the apparatus should play a key role was also
picked up by Rosenfeld, who subsequently advocated—
in an “unqualified endorsement,” in Jammer’s words [22,
p. 493]—the proposal of Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi
[23]. At any rate, curiously both Weizsa¨cker and Rosen-
feld defended their physical approach to the quantum-to-
classical transition as being in line with the spirit in which
Bohr had intended his doctrine of classical concepts.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DECOHERENCE AND THE DOCTRINE OF
CLASSICAL CONCEPTS
To what extent does decoherence mark a departure
from the doctrine of classical concepts? As our analy-
sis should have made clear, the answer will depend on
the particular interpretation of the doctrine. Decoher-
ence and Bohr’s own reading of classical concepts plow
rather different fields. Decoherence is concerned with the
evolution of reduced density matrices and describes the
dynamical selection of (improper) ensembles of certain,
typically “quasiclassical” quantum states. Bohr’s doc-
trine of classical concepts, on the other hand, is never
phrased in terms of quantum states; it is about interpret-
ing quantum theory. It is motivated by two demands
that Bohr saw as a prerequisite for an unambiguous and
objective description of quantum phenomena. First, the
logical demand for separability between the observed (the
system) and the observer (the apparatus). And second,
the demand for a classical description of the functioning
of the measuring instrument. Bohr’s doctrine is couched
in categorical terms, and given an epistemological or even
linguistic reading.
Since decoherence is simply a consequence of a realistic
application of the standard quantum formalism, it can-
not by itself give an interpretation or explanation of this
formalism. Bohr’s fundamental point was that any in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics must in the end fall
back on the use of classical concepts. And this means
that, while we may be inclined to invoke decoherence to
justify, in a practical sense, Bohr’s philosophical stance
about the categorical use of classical concepts, we would
run a certain risk of circularity in making such an argu-
ment.
It is the rather different versions of the doctrine ad-
vocated and developed by Bohr’s followers—in particu-
lar, the physical and pragmatic approaches of Rosenfeld,
Weizsa¨cker, and others—that make closer contact with
the spirit of the decoherence program and its notion of
classicality. Decoherence may here be seen as providing
a physical justification for the pragmatic use of classical
concepts in a given experimental situation. And if we
choose to re-interpret the Heisenberg cut as the boundary
at which it becomes difficult to observe certain quantum
states, then decoherence explains and quantifies the cut.
In this interpretation, then, decoherence explains why,
when, and where classical physics is a good approxima-
tion in dealing with the quantum world, thus providing
an answer to the question that Heisenberg, Rosenfeld,
and Weizsa¨cker were asking when they tried to find a
physical foundation for Bohr’s doctrine.
Howard [24], in his “reconstruction” of Bohr’s inter-
pretation, has suggested that Bohr’s classical concepts
may be identified with the selection of subensembles
that are appropriate to the measurement context (or, in
Bohr’s terminology, that are appropriate to the particu-
lar “experimental arrangement”). That is, to apply clas-
sical concepts means replacing the global pure entangled
system–apparatus state (resulting from von Neumann’s
measurement scheme) with the proper mixture for the
measured system expressed in the eigenbasis of the to-
be-measured observable. This mixture then exhaustively
encapsulates the statistics for the chosen measurement.
Decoherence could be nicely put to use in such account,
as it would describe the dynamical emergence of such
(albeit improper!) mixtures.
Interestingly, one can find a few passages in Heisen-
berg’s writings that seem to hint at an early recognition
of the role of the environment—which is so paramount
to the decoherence program—in the relationship between
quantum and classical. Here’s an example, from Physics
and Philosophy:
It must be observed that the system which is
treated by the methods of quantum mechan-
ics is in fact a part of a much bigger system
(eventually the whole world); it is interact-
ing with this bigger system; and one must
add that the microscopic properties of the
bigger system are (at least to a large extent)
6unknown. This statement is undoubtedly a
correct description of the actual situation . . .
The interaction with the bigger system with
its undefined microscopic properties then in-
troduces a new statistical element into the
description . . . of the system under consid-
eration. In the limiting case of the large di-
mensions this statistical element destroys the
effects of the “interference of probabilities” in
such a manner that the quantum-mechanical
scheme really approaches the classical one in
the limit [13, pp. 121–2].
And elsewhere, Heisenberg argues that the quantum-to-
classical transition depends on “the underlying assump-
tion,” implicit in the Copenhagen interpretation, “that
the interference terms are in the actual experiment re-
moved by the partly undefined interactions of the mea-
suring apparatus, with the system and with the rest of
the world (in the formalism, the interaction produces a
‘mixture’)” [25, p. 23]. This comes surprisingly close to
the spirit of decoherence. However, one should not overin-
terpret Heisenberg’s clairvoyance: the crucial ingredient
of decoherence, entanglement, is not part of Heisenberg’s
account.
What would Bohr say if he had known about decoher-
ence? Our feeling is that, while he would have certainly
regarded decoherence as a useful application of quantum
theory, he would probably not have changed his position
on the irreducibility of classical concepts. Indeed, as we
hope to have shown, maintaining a peaceful coexistence
between Bohr’s philosophy and decoherence may be more
feasible than often claimed.
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